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Abstract 
Short food supply chains (SFSCs) are economic organizations which can contribute to rural 
development. We propose a first analysis of their main features and suggest a way for analysing them 
through the lens of organizational economics. SFSCs are based on proximity between consumers and 
producers, economic added-value, re-distributive principles and sustainability. They mainly rely on 
informal and socially-embedded governance mechanisms. We derive insights for better link SFSCs  
and policy design. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The interest in food supply chains other than conventional ones has increased rapidly in recent 
years. New food chains have been established in which shortening the relationship between producers 
and consumers is a key element, especially in Europe and the United Stated (Moynihan and 
McDonagh, 2008). The change in consumer perception of food products -due to food scandals and 
GMO practises- on the one hand and the pressure on the income of many farmers -due to the 
modernisation and mechanisation of the agro-food sector- on the other, certainly contributed to this 
(Renting et al., 2003, Ilbery and Maye, 2005, Sonnino and Marsden, 2006).  
In many cases this development is associated with an increased interest in so called ‘local 
foods’. Some authors prefer the term alternative food supply chain to describe these chains, which 
reflects the aim of many of them; to provide an alternative for the globalised and industrialized food 
production (Renting et al., 2003). Others rather speak in terms of networks, as it will compromise of a 
network of social interactions between primary producers and end-consumers (Pascucci, 2010). In this 
paper the labels ‘short’ and ‘chain’ are used as food chains are the mechanism through which food 
moves from producer to consumer and the aim is to shorten this food supply chain.  
A short food supply chain (SFSC) is a wide-ranging concept and varying interpretations are 
used; there is no consensus on a precise definition (King et al., 2010). For example, on-farm direct 
sales to consumers are interpreted as a type of SFSC, but also the international supply of a special 
regional food product is considered as a type of SFSC. Nevertheless, we could say that they all share 
the aim to reconfigure the relationships between primary producers and consumers. Accordingly, the 
following preliminary definition of short food chains (SFSC) is maintained based on the work of 
Marsden et al. (2000).  
A SFSC is a food supply chain that short-circuits the long, anonymous supply chain 
characteristics of the industrial mode of food production, and has the intention to increase the 
generated added-value. Although SFSCs are of recent date, they have been studied widely using 
different perspectives. An orientating review of the relevant literature learns us that literature written 
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from a business point of view is less available (Venn et al., 2006). In line with Forsman and Paananen 
(2004), the authors contributing to this field represent disciplines such as (social) rural development 
(Allen et al., 2003, DuPuis and Goodman, 2005, Marsden et al., 2000, Renting et al., 2003, Sage, 
2003, Van Der Ploeg et al., 2000) or geographical (political) sciences (Feagan, 2007, Goodman, 2004, 
Little et al., 2012, Watts et al., 2005). Moreover, many researches discuss the potentials of SFSCs, 
their outcomes and their eventual impact on the society, economy and environment. Instead of 
discussing the potentials of SFSCs, this paper focuses on the economic organizations of SFSCs.  
2. DEFINING A SFSC 
2.1. Based on characteristics of SFSCs 
Short food supply chains attempt to – as already highlighted by the first word – shorten the food 
supply chain from producer to consumer. More specifically we are interested in answering the 
question, what makes a SFSC actually different from other food chains? Hence, this section is 
implemented to discover the determinants of the differentiating characteristics of SFSCs. In order to 
investigate this, different definitions provided in literature are selected and reviewed, notable both for 
their similarities and differences. A few remarks could be made regarding the literature.  
First of all, the term SFSC is not very often used in the literature compared with other terms. 
Most commonly preferred is to focus on local food followed by notions of alternative food networks 
and systems (Allen et al., 2003, Feagan, 2007, Hinrichs, 2003, Watts et al., 2005) or what other 
consider as civic and demographic agriculture (DeLind, 2002, Lyson, 2000). The relevant literature 
focuses on the attributes of food products (frequently being geographically distinctive) as well as the 
mechanisms of processing and retailing (local) food, which are in our research considered as SFSCs. 
Hence, both definitions of local food and SFSCs are investigated presented in Error! Reference 
source not found. and Error! Reference source not found.. The aim is not to provide an exhaustive 
list, but to derive prevalent components of a SFSC and local food. Surprisingly, the term local food 
and terms referring to SFSCs are often studied without explicitly defining the concept, taking its 
meaning more or less for granted. Most of the time they are referred to as qualities which are attributed 
to a distinctive geographic origin (Kneafsey, 2010). If we review the selected definitions of local food 
and SFSCs, a lot of overlapping themes are present which affirms the correspondence between the two 
concepts. The themes used to define local food are not very different from those used in the definitions 
of SFSCs. Though, the emphasis in definitions of local food is more likely to be on geographical 
proximity, whereas the definitions of SFSCs more rely on social constructions. SFSCs are often 
considered as networks, relations between trading partners or producer and consumer and even as 
innovative modes of food provision. 
Based on these definition, four prevalent components could be derived. First, the majority of the 
definitions refer to the geographical proximity. Terms as ‘rooted in particular places’, ‘re-spatialise 
food’ ‘commitment to nearby place’, ‘geographical distance’ are used which emphasise the importance 
of proximity. The second component refers to the economic added value, or in other words the 
‘producer profitability’, ‘economic and rural development’, or the redistribution of value along the 
supply chain. Not every definition highlights the economic aspects of these chains, but it is used 
frequently enough to consider is as an important attribute. Third, many times social enhancements are 
highlighted, for example authors use phrases as ‘enhance social equity and democracy’, ‘re-socialise 
food’, ‘providing social care’ or ‘improving civic responsibility’. Though, according to Goodman 
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(2004) SFSC could also involve socially exclusive niches (Goodman, 2004). In definitions concerning 
SFSCs many times is referred to ‘connectedness’ between producer and consumer and community. So, 
significance of social attributes is demonstrated widely. Fourth, quite often definitions refer to 
sustainability or the environment. This could include animal welfare, agriculture landscape as well as 
‘getting biodiversity from farm to plate, saving energy and reducing food miles’.  
By reviewing these definitions, the ideas that the provision of local food or SFSCs is inherently 
good and brings about different benefits are fundamentally prevailing, but are they? By reviewing the 
literature, it becomes less remarkable that these ideas are prevalent, since a majority of literature stems 
from political-economic and social rural development disciplines (Tregear, 2011). According to these 
perspectives, initiatives are many times conceptualized as counter movements to threatening forces of 
global capitalism or considered as potential solutions for improving the situation in lagging rural areas. 
Furthermore, literature mainly stems from the United States of America and Western Europe. A 
difference between these two literature fields with regard to the perception of SFSCs is notable. In 
American literature, they are rather seen as potentials to resist the mainstream agribusinesses and tend 
to be used in a more political context (Holloway et al., 2007). In contrast, European SFSC literature 
concentrates its definitional discussions more on rural economy, food safety issues and society 
(Goodman, 2004, Sonnino and Marsden, 2006).Next to all advocates, others do show their cautions 
and refer for example to ‘the local trap’ (Born and Purcell, 2006); the tendency of food activists and 
researchers to prefer local a priori to larger scales. Also Goodman (2004) is doubtful about the positive 
aspects of SFSCs as already highlighted in Error! Reference source not found.. Tregear (2011) 
critically reflects on the connotations of SFSCs and recognizes a tendency to conflate characteristics of 
SFSCs with specific desirable outcomes or certain food properties. She argues that desirable outcomes 
such as social justice or economic viability are not inherent to food systems operating on a local scale. 
Accordingly, the outcome of SFSCs depends on the orientation of the involved actors. The same 
applies to the opportunities for SFSCs to offer healthier and more nutritious foods. There is no a priori 
reason to expect it to be related to the spatial or structural characteristics of these food systems (Born 
and Purcell, 2006). These insights are very useful to put SFSCs into perspective.  
2.2. Based on market arrangements 
Next to definitions based on characteristics, definitions of SFSCs based on market arrangements 
are also well-recognized (Martinez et al., 2010). Within the great diversity, a broad distinction could 
be made between two types of market arrangements concerning SFSCs:  
 Direct-to-consumer SFSCs 
 Intermediate SFSCs 
SFSCs including direct to consumer arrangements comprises food chain channels, such as 
farmers market, road stands and on-farm shops; supply chains in which the producer of the food 
products meets the consumer directly. Intermediate SFSCs on the other hand, involves intermediaries 
to supply consumers and bypasses the direct-to consumer market as well as the undifferentiated 
commodity markets. They could include new formed institutions such as producer’s cooperatives or 
consumer buying clubs, but also established retailers that have somehow become involved in selling 
regionally based food. This could be for the reason to respond to consumer demands, to create 
competitive advantage and/or to provide local producers with retail space to sell their goods (Ilbery 
and Maye, 2006).  
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3. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES OF SFSCS 
A great variety among the organization of SFSCs exists. On the one hand, the direct to 
consumer SFSCs in which food is distributed from one producer to a consumer and on the other the 
intermediate SFSCs which include more parties to supply food. The urge of using other distribution 
channels and aggregate products to fulfil consumer demand is widely recognized and lead to more 
complex organizational structures. Hence, insights from supply chain management (SCM) and 
transaction cost economics (TCE) are used to provide a better understanding of the organization of 
SFSCs.  
Theories from a supply chain managerial perspective are used to provide insight in the 
functioning of supply chains as a whole. TCE is used as the theories focus on organizational structure 
by using transactions between (chain) parties as the unit of analysis. It approaches and rationalizes the 
organisational structure mainly from a dyadic perspective rather than a supply chain perspective. By 
combing these two fields of literature the organisational structure of transactions between firms as well 
as at chain level is incorporated.  
Literature concerning the organization of SFSCs is less prevalent, however the importance of 
working together to make the supply of local food a success reveals. Hence, the key element for 
SFSCs is the creation of new collaborative supply chains to market differentiated products (USDA, 
2012). This is for example underpinned by the value chain approach argued by Stevenson and Pirog 
(2008) and Bloom and Hinrichs (2011) as well as King et al. (2010) which concludes that SFSCs 
consistently involve important durable trading partner relationships. For that reason, this part of the 
literature study starts with discussing theories concerning supply chain collaboration (section 3.1.), 
followed by the governance structure (section 3.2) and coordination mechanisms (section 3.3).  
3.1. Supply chain collaboration  
Supply chain collaboration is considered as chain members which are actively working together 
to create competitive advantage and satisfy customers’ needs (Matopoulos et al., 2007, Mentzer et al., 
2000). It goes beyond purely transactions and is seen as a significant process that holds the 
opportunity for value creation (Cao and Zhang, 2011, Fu and Piplani, 2004). Theories from this supply 
chain discipline help to provide insights in the process of collaboration in SFSCs.  
Hanf and Dautzenberg (2006) and Matopoulos et al. (2007) made a conceptual framework 
which comprises the theoretical aspects of supply chain management. They consider a supply chain as 
the collaboration between involved firms represented by a collaboration strategy, as the overall 
strategy establishes the structure of the chain management. From these frameworks, two dimensions 
determinant for the collaboration strategy could be derived. First, a collaboration strategy facilitates 
the alignment of involved parties and agreement on the objectives of cooperation. By establishing a 
collaborative strategy it is important that partners are motivated to collaborate and act in a manner 
consistent with the mutual strategic objectives rather than own goals (Simatupang and Sridharan, 
2004). Second, the collaboration strategy incorporates the management of the interdependencies. The 
actions of involved parties should be aligned, or in other words coordinated. Hence, to achieve 
collaboration along a supply chain, the cooperation between parties as well as the coordination are 
important elements.     
Concerning the collaborative strategy of a food chain, the focal company reserves a major role. 
The focal firm is generally seen as being responsible for the specific food item and the other firms 
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usually are dependent. Though, mutual dependencies exist and supplying organizations could also 
obtain some power from the focal company (Belaya and Hanf, 2008). As the focal firm is the leading 
firm, it should manage the entire chain, which consist of a collective strategy that addresses both 
strategies to cooperate and coordinate. In most cases, the focal firm could be seen as the chain 
initiator. Certainly in SFSCs the initiator is equivalent to the focal firm (Baltussen et al., 2008). In 
most cases the SFSC initiative is in hands of a primary producer (supplier), distributing organization 
or buying party, which makes the chain either push or pull driven. Furthermore, a SFSC could be 
initiated by a (non-) governmental organization. However, research shows that these kinds of 
initiatives face difficulties to ensure subsistence on the long run. These initiatives rather formulate a 
strategy serving a societal function by for example focussing on the intake of healthy food or 
education on food provision. In that case firms must be convinced of the added value of the initiative, 
which is not always self-evident (Voort et al., 2011). The chain initiator plays thus an important role in 
the formulation of a collective strategy, which derives both cooperation and coordination.  
Cooperation refers to the partnering strategy (Hanf and Dautzenberg, 2006), the design and 
government of activities (Matopoulos et al., 2007) and the alignment of interest (Gulati et al., 2005). 
These are all expressions to describe the arrangements among exchanges between firms. Different 
factors could be an incentive to cooperate with other chain members. This could refer to satisfying the 
end-consumer or optimize operational processes, improve innovation, reduce risks etc. Sharing costs 
and benefits is probably one of the crucial factors to guide companies to close cooperation 
(Matopoulos et al., 2007). Partners should share the gain as well as the pain (Cao and Zhang, 2011, 
Mentzer et al., 2000). 
The extent to which parties are cooperating or in other words the ‘depth’ of cooperation could 
be explained by determining the orientation of cooperation. Mentzer et al. (2000) suggest that this 
orientation exists on a continuum varying from strategic to operational cooperation. Operational 
cooperation comprises the optimization of operational efficiency and effectiveness. It involves a short 
term relationship, which obtains to enhance e.g. delivery time, stock level, and quality customer 
service level. Strategic cooperation in contrast is an on-going, long term inter-firm relationship. It aims 
at increasing customer value and enhances the competitive position of firms. In comparison with 
operational cooperation, this form of cooperation is more complex to implement and requires more 
organizational resources.  
Operational cooperation could be effective to accomplish short term goals. However, in case of 
establishing a new product or supply chain, only an operational orientation is not sufficient. Research 
based on Dutch case studies points out that in case only operational relations between producers and 
purchasers are established, the risk others will enter the market and copy the product is rather high. 
Especially in case there aren’t a lot of chain parties and the product is not very differentiated 
(Baltussen et al., 2008). By creating a strategic relationship between chain parties the involved food 
products are more difficult to reproduce by others, and thus ahead of the competition. Since the 
implementation of a strategic partnership is rather time consuming.  
Notwithstanding the orientation of cooperation, it is important that firms are motivated to 
cooperate and act in a manner consistent with the mutual objectives rather than own goals 
(Simatupang and Sridharan, 2004). If problems in cooperation arise, most of the time this is caused by 
optimizing individual benefits instead of striving for collectively beneficial outcomes (Gulati et al., 
2005 in Hanf and Dautzenberg, 2007). Hence, Gulati et al. (2005) consider problems in cooperation –
alignment of interests- as problems of motivation. So, to align the interests, govern activities, design a 
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partnering strategy beneficial for both involved parties, clear governance structures are necessary 
(Hanf and Dautzenberg, 2006). Hence, the cooperation between parties (alignment of interest) could 
be further explained by using insights of the governance structures, which are discussed in the next 
section.  
3.2 Governance structure 
A governance structure (GS) refers to the way in which transactions are carried out and 
administrated. A GS provides efficiency (i.e. minimize transaction costs) of transactions by 
incorporating the attributes of the transaction and environment in which the transaction is carried out. 
Hence, some governance structures are more efficient than others (Menard 2004). Derived from TCE, 
all governance structures vary between two extremes, a continuum between market on the one side 
and a firm on the other depending on the level of integration of activities, as shown in  
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Continuum of governance structures adapted from Peterson et al. (2001)  
 
 
On one end of the continuum, transactions are organized using the market. There is no 
alignment between parties except the price and both parties are not required to make specific 
investments and long-run relations are not ensured. The other end of the continuum involves 
transactions which are organized by vertical integration of activities of both firms; two parties in a 
transaction becoming one party. Formed by mutual interest, shared goals, reciprocity and pooled 
resources, activities of both actors could be totally integrated. Next two these two structures, 
alternative governance structures -known as hybrids- are formulated (Slangen et al, 2008). Hybrids can 
neither rely on direct supervision nor on prices, therefore specific governance structures for 
cooperating and coordinating transactions are necessary. Especially in the agro-food sector hybrids are 
prominent, many transactions are governed by tailored structures and coordination mechanisms.  
Hybrids could refer to many governance structures, varying from joint-ventures, cooperatives, 
sport leagues, franchisors to collaborative trade market etc. As Baker (2008) in Menard (2010) cites, 
‘firms have invented far more ways to work together than organizational economics has so far 
expressed’. As governance structures take into account the attributes of transactions and the 
environment, they vary heavily in their nature. Peterson et al. (2001) provide an understandable 
differentiation of hybrid structures taken into account the identity of involved parties and intensity of 
cooperation. They made the following distinction among hybrid structures 
 
Contracts 
Contracts are a well-known governance structures for conducting an exchange. Transactions are 
performed using a bilateral contract in which the conditions of the transactions are specified. The price 
Market Hybrids Firm 
Independency 
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Own interest 
Short-term 
Interdependency 
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is leading and broadly accepted performance standards provide the base. Compared with the spot-
market structure, parties have to invest more time to transact as more factors count than price setting 
and a yes or no decision (Peterson et al., 2001). Coordination increases and parties could rely on for 
example directives and safeguards or a third party in case one party failed to meet the requirements. 
Contracting governance structures based on durable relationships often coordinate more efficient than 
spot markets while avoiding integration of activities and its bureaucratic burden of more integrated 
governance structures (Ménard, 2004).  
Relation-based alliance 
A relation-based alliance could be seen as ‘an exchange relationship in which involved parties 
share risks and benefits emanating from mutually identified objectives’(Peterson et al., 2001). The 
main differences compared to contracts are that more than two parties could be involved and 
transactions are more complex. Parties are pooling part their resources, agree to work closely and must 
find means to solve internal differences and concerns, while they both remain separate entities.  For 
the sake of clarity, these alliances could use and they do many times in practice, contracts as part of 
their relationship. These contracts could be seen as self- enforcing and mainly based on reputation as 
the identity of parties, informal agreements, rules, norms and incentives are crucial (Slangen et al., 
2008). The existence of a contract in an exchange relationship does not necessarily mean that the GS is 
covered by the contract portion of the continuum; it could be seen as part of the alliances’ basis.  
Equity-based alliances  
This third type of hybrids is most discussed in literature and embraces cooperatives, joint-
ventures and other more formal governance structures which involve some shared equity capital 
between parties. These governance structures rely on decentralized decisions, contracts and formulized 
procedures. A distinguishing feature of this organizational structure compared to a relation-based 
alliance is the presence of a formal organisation that has an identity distinct from the exchange actors 
and that is designed to be their joint agent in the conduct of the coordination activity (Peterson et al., 
2001, Slangen et al., 2008). An equity commitment is made which makes defining of control rights 
and responsibilities more clear and coordination is arranged by a formal organisation structure. The 
ability to undo the cooperation is very little, as substantial investments in the new independent identity 
are made.    
In the European agro-food industry, relation-based alliances and equity-based alliances among 
farmers and participants have become increasingly important (Ménard and Klein, 2004). According to 
Ménard and Klein (2004) they ‘represent a balance between the benefits of centralized coordination 
and control and the incentive and informational advantages of decentralized decision-making’. 
Alliances are also seen as networks as they represent ‘arrangements involving a set of recurrent 
contractual ties among entities’ (Ménard, 2004). While network members pool significant resources, 
they often rely on relational contracts, rather than formal written agreements, though they do establish 
some formal mechanism for coordinating (Ménard and Klein, 2004).  
The continuum shows us a classification among different governance structures to align 
interests of involved parties. The GS is a source of value as it governs transactions efficiently by taken 
into account the attribution of the transactions, identity of involved parties and their mutual relation. In 
the context of SFSCs, food is transacted and the relationship and identity of involved parties differ 
among cases. These involved parties could be both firms, but also involve consumers in case of direct 
to consumer supply chains. However, the literature related to governance structure does not include 
the involvement of consumers in their theories.  
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To indicate the governance structure especially used by direct to consumer SFSCs, authors try 
to conceptualize the interaction between producers and consumers and refer for instance to local 
partnerships (Lamine, 2005) or food community networks (FNC) (Pascucci, 2010). Notable in case the 
bilateral interaction between farmers and consumer shows an increase in mutual dependence and 
decision right sharing. This could entail different forms, for instance private companies involving 
consumers as individuals, cooperative farms or schemes run by social insertion organisations for 
unemployed and low qualified people (Lamine, 2005), or more concrete, Community Supported 
Agriculture (CSA), farmer markets, box schemes or  consumer buying groups (cooperatives) etc. are 
part of these ‘different’ governance structures.  
The fundament of these producer-consumer governance structures is that consumers and 
producer strongly integrate or align their goals by the sharing and pooling part resources. Consumers 
invest time, information and financial resources and obtain guarantees of freshness and origin and 
perhaps a more qualitative nature concerning production practices.  Producers are more certain of a 
stable income and  reduce some of their costs (e.g. labour or certification) (Pascucci, 2010, Lamine, 
2005). Applying the classification above, we could consider these governance structures also as a 
relation-based alliance or equity-based alliance. The mutuality in interests and sharing risks and 
benefits represents namely the base of a relation-based alliance. And in case a formal entity is formed 
and involved parties share also equity capital, for example by establishing a consumer cooperative, we 
could refer to an equity-based governance structure.  
To distinguish different governance structures used in direct to consumer SFSCs and 
intermediate ones, we should distinguish between levels of consumer participation, corresponding to 
the level of integration of activities. Are they really involved in a firm’s business or just a consumer 
which purchases directly from the producer? CSA, a farmer market as well as an on-farm shop are for 
example using direct marketing, though they differ in the degree of consumer participation. 
Considering them all as applying the same governance structure would be too restrictive. CSA is a 
partnership between farmers and consumers working together through membership. Consumer could 
be part of the farm and therefore maintain a relation-based alliance or an equity-based alliance. 
Meanwhile in farmer markets or shopping at an on-farm shop consumers are more likely to be not 
involved in a farm’s business, hence rather a spot-market (supply and demand governs the 
transactions) represents the governance structure. So, to investigate the governance structure used 
within a SFSC, a distinction should be made whether the involved parties are firms and/or consumers 
and to what extent they are participating in one’s business. 
So far, different governance structures indicate how involved parties are related to each other 
and transactions are carried out.  In case of SFSCs the involved parties could be both firms and 
consumers. To distinguish the governance structure among direct to consumer supply chains, the level 
of consumer participation should be taken into account. The continuum of governance structures 
shows us five different structures.  Depending on the level of activities; the market, contract, relation-
based alliance, equity-based alliance or an integrated firm could represent governance structures of 
SFSCs.  
Furthermore, parties involved in a transaction will always follow a mechanism to coordinate 
transactions, of which the importance is already discussed before. On the base of the collaboration 
strategy lies the cooperation as well as coordination. The focus on the alignment of actions of involved 
parties and maintenance of relationships could not be excluded. This brings us to the next section 
which discusses different coordination mechanisms.  
  11 
3.3 Coordination mechanisms 
Coordination refers to alignment of actions (Gulati, 2005), maintenance of relationships 
(Matopoulos, 2007) or supply chain management (Hanf and Dautzenberg, 2006). All phrases which 
refer to the incorporation of each other’s actions and hence the predictability of others’ actions. Good 
coordination is necessary to deal with uncertainty about the behaviour of involved parties and the 
decision rules and to enable mutual adjustment on an on-going basis.  
To provide more insights in the nature of coordination, one could refer to coordination 
mechanisms which reflect the mechanisms used to govern transactions. The coordination mechanisms 
closely relate to a governance structure as the nature of coordinating transactions characterizes the 
type of governance structure (Slangen et al., 2008). Figure 2 presents four groups of coordination 
mechanisms which are discussed below.  
 
Figure 2: Four coordination mechanisms adapted from Borgen and Hegrenes (2005) 
 
Price 
The price as a coordination mechanism corresponds in the ideal-typical situation to the market 
as governance structure. Derived from the principles of Adam Smith, the market is coordinated by 
only the supply and demand of products and therefore the price is the most important coordination 
mechanism (Peterson et al., 2001). Also, the price could also be an additional coordination 
mechanism. In that case the price provides coordination by functioning as a compensation or 
motivation for the transaction. For most governance structures price is not sufficient to coordinate the 
transaction and hence other coordination mechanisms are used (Slangen et al., 2008).  
Authority 
On the other end of the continuum, the firm, transactions are more likely to be coordinated by 
direct supervision and authority; or in other words the visible hand (Peterson et al., 2001). This kind of 
coordination is most of the time used in case a legal entity is formed which has the control (e.g. 
equity-based alliances and firms). This formal entity (higher in hierarchy) is responsible for the work 
of other firms (lower in hierarchy) and for coordinating the transaction by defining a plan according to 
which the firms should act. This is often associated with economies of scale, transaction specific 
investments and the protection of knowledge (Borgen and Hegrenes, 2005).  
Rational 
Alternative to price and authority, parties could coordinate their transactions using rational 
oriented mechanisms which are understood as rules, directives and safeguards. These mechanisms can 
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be used to secure expected quality of products or secure equal tasks (Borgen and Hegrenes, 2005, 
Slangen et al., 2008). It is used in governance structures based on an instrumental motive, driven by 
self-interest and distrust. Hence, specified contracts are strongly coordinated by rules, directives and 
safeguards in which price plays an subordinate role. 
Social 
In addition to the more formal mechanisms of coordination (e.g. rational and authority oriented), 
a number of informal elements could increase the predictability of other’s behaviour and how the other 
should behave and thus enable coordination. Personal relationships, mutual adjustment, common 
values and norms function as coordination mechanisms. The social embeddedness is used as a guide to 
coordinate. In governance structures using social coordination mechanisms, informal agreements, 
reputation and repeated transactions are determinant rather than legal enforceability. Relational-based 
alliances emphasis from origin more on social mechanisms, a third party judge is practical not across 
in most of the agreements neither a formal joint management structure. The coordinating mechanism 
is based on mutual control arising from mutual interest (Peterson et al., 2001). 
The four groups of coordination mechanisms are distinguished but they don’t exclude each 
other and could be simultaneously applied in a governance structure. There is no one-to-one 
correspondence between coordination mechanisms and governance structure. Which coordination 
mechanisms are prevalent in SFSCs has not been studied in depth. However, Abatekassa and Peterson 
(2011) indicate the importance of social aspects and state that SFSCs are mainly based on existing 
relationships and linkages between the supply chain actors. Their results indicate that local food 
supply to retail outlets depends not only on the traditional supplier selection criteria such as price, 
volume and quality, but also on factors such as trust, reliability and information sharing. Hence, the 
social relationship between firms is also determinant and functions as a coordination mechanism. This 
is also in line with research focussed on farmer markets which shows that price is not a determining 
factor in consumers’ decision to participate (Pascucci et al., 2011), rather the direct interaction with 
producers, or the specific quality features of the foods coordinate transaction. 
The social oriented coordination could on itself be an important mechanism to coordinate, but 
also lower the importance of other coordination mechanisms. Research points out that in case there is 
a great deal trust between consumers and the selling entity, there is less of a need to specify the origin 
of products (which farmer produced the item) or to create a unique third-party certification scheme 
(USDA, 2012). Hence, the personal relationship between parties decreases the need to use rational 
oriented coordination mechanisms to take into account each other’s behaviour. Furthermore, King et 
al. (2010) concludes that close relationships give producers in the intermediated supply chains some 
flexibility in setting prices independent of commodity market prices. In such relationships the trading 
partners are willing to forego short run price opportunities offered by other firms. So, the social 
orientation is preferred above the price coordination mechanism.  
On the other hand, research shows us that social mechanisms do play a role, but subordinate to 
the market-based relationships. If intermediate SFSCs become more successful, in terms of volume 
and sales, businesses tend to rely more on rational mechanisms instead of social mechanisms (Bloom 
and Hinrichs, 2011 and Stevenson and Pirog, 2008). So, depending on the transaction, involved parties 
and their mutual relationship, some coordination mechanisms tend to be more effective and efficient 
than others.  
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4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The literature concerning SFSCs is inherently associated with local food. Due to small number 
of research areas that contribute to the literature, many authors consider SFSCs opening up potential 
for rural development. They are claimed to form a countermovement to avoid the threatening forces of 
global industrialized food chains. After a review of several definitions of local food and terms related 
to a SFSC, four prevalent disciplines are derived. Accordingly, SFSCs refer to (i) proximity between 
producers and consumers, mainly (but not only) related to a specific geographic area, which might 
contain both producers and consumers; (ii) added value for producers or local economy, (iii) 
connectedness and re-distributive effects between producers and consumer and community; (iv) lastly 
SFSCs could enhance sustainability. However the economic viability of SFSCs regarding farms is still 
difficult to assess and differs among cases. For example farm size, location, farm engagement in other 
entrepreneurial activities and the used market arrangements determine the extent to which SFSCs 
contribute to the total revenues of farms.  
From a social perspective the interaction between consumers and SFSC farms could be assessed 
on a producer-consumer level and community-network level. Using the perspective of producer and 
consumer interaction, the territory and identify preservation of food products is very important to 
differentiate the involved food products. Concerning SFSCs, producer and consumer could interact in 
different ways (i.e. face to face, proximate and extended) depending on the level of spatial extension 
SFSCs. From a community network level, the prevailing literature focuses on the engagement in the 
society of involved SFSC parties. For example by using the concept of social capital, community 
building efforts of involved parties could contribute to the SFSCs businesses.  
In this paper we have highlighted how tackling SFSCs from an organizational economics 
perspective can be relevant for designing better policy interventions to support their contribution in the 
rural development processes. SFSCs should be seen as a way of organizing food transactions where 
consumers and producers can rely on more informal and social-based governance mechanisms. SFSCs 
are economic organizations which can provide value-added to their participants in a way this is more 
shared and re-distributed that so-called mainstream supply chains. However in our view SFSCs are not 
necessarily alternative to mainstream food supply chains but present many features that can make 
them complementary.  
This paper constitutes only a first attempt to further model and analyse these economic 
organizations, and to assess the impact of different public interventions on their performances, both in 
the short and long run. 
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Annex 1 Selected definition of local food found in literature 
 
Definition of local food  Author 
 Reducing the geographical distance between producers and consumers, but also embracing 
other sustainability criteria that include health, fair trading relations, producer 
profitability, environmental benefits, access and social inclusivity, animal welfare and 
cultural conditions 
Sustain, UK Alliance for 
Better Food and Farming 
(Ilbery and Maye, 2006) 
 Refers to ‘good food’ which constitutes a dialectical alternative; food which is authentic, 
derivative of a place or person(s), produced with regard to principles of sustainability, 
naturalness, animal welfare and associated with particular spaces (regions, localities and 
fields where animals graze, vegetables are grown, or materials transformed) 
Sage (2003) 
 Food grown or processed locally and purchased by restaurants from the local market or 
primarily through local producers 
Sharma et al., 2009) 
 Food produced and consumed by exploiting the raw material and production inputs within 
the region, promoting the economic development and employment of this particular area. 
The particular area may be a municipality, province, or economic area 
Finnish Rural Policy 
Committee ‘02 in 
(Forsman and Paananen, 
2004) 
 Foods which offer a closer ‘connection’ with the point of production and an opportunity to 
support the local economy 
Guptil and Wilksons 
(2003) 
 A banner under which people attempt to counteract trends of economic concentration, 
social disempowerment, and environmental degradation in the food and agricultural 
landscape 
Hinrichs (2003) 
 Is produced locally/regionally, contributes to the local/regional rural development 
strategy, sold to the consumer through the shortest chain that is possible (directly or via one 
intermediary), sold at a speciality shop or open-market on a local contract , but could not 
be sold to a retail central buying department,  targeted at consumers with one or more 
specific selling points such as taste, freshness, high quality, cultural motivation, local 
tradition, local speciality, animal welfare, environmental value and is distributed as close as 
possible with a maximum radius of 30 miles 
Opinion of the European 
Union Committee of the 
Regions on ‘Local food 
systems’ (2011) 
 Any agricultural food product that is raised, produced, and distributed in the locality or 
region in which the final product is marketed, so that the total distance the product is 
transported is less than 400 miles from the origin of the product or the State in which the 
product is produced. 
US - Federal rural 
development loan 
program (King et al., 
2010) 
  17 
Annex 1: Selected definitions of a SFSC found in literature 
Definition of a SFSC Author 
 Rooted in particular places, aim to be economically viable for farmers and consumers, use 
ecologically sound production and distribution practises, and enhance social equity and 
democracy for all members of the community 
Feenstra (1997)  
 Emphasis upon the type of relationship between the producer and the consumer in these 
supply chains, and the role of this relationship in constructing value and meaning, rather than 
solely the type of product itself 
Marsden et al. (2000) 
 Emphasis on ‘their capacity to re-socialise or re-spatialise food, thereby allowing the 
consumer to make new value judgments about the relative desirability of foods on the basis of 
their own knowledge, experience, or perceived imagery’ 
Renting et al. (2004) 
 A more sustainable option—a means of getting biodiversity from farm to plate, of saving 
energy and reducing food miles, of providing social care and improving civic responsibility, 
and of retaining economic value in a local economy 
Ilbery et al. (2005) 
 Reduce the number of intermediaries and spatial distance between producers and consumers 
and often described as strategies to promote rural development by redistributing value 
along the food supply chain 
Bloom and Hinrichs 
(2011) 
 Natural and social networks formed through common knowledge and understanding of 
particular places, embedded in their localities 
 Kremer and DeLiberty 
(2011) 
 The set of trading partner relationships and transactions that delivers a local food product 
from producers to consumers which conveys information about the product that enables 
consumers to recognize it as a local food product and strives to establish a bond between the 
producer and the consumer, even when separated by intermediary segments in the supply 
chain 
King et al. (2010) 
 Constitution that redistribute value through the network against the logic of bulk commodity 
production; that reconvene `trust' between food producers and consumers; and that articulate 
new forms of political association and market governance 
Whatmore et al. (2003) 
 Systems that entail market relations in the delivery of food from producer to consumer based 
on familiarity with and commitment to nearby place, community and environment 
Hinrichs (2000) 
 New models that engage public concerns about community, social justice, health issues such 
as nutrition and food safety, and environmental sustainability  
EU – Facilitating 
Alternative Agro-Food 
Networks program 
(2010)  
 Innovative modes of food provisioning which represent socially exclusive niches rather than 
the future of European rural economy and society 
Goodman (2004) 
 
